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Abstract
We analyze the e⁄ects of family ties on the incentives for production of e⁄ort,
where family ties are de￿ned as a mixture of true and coerced altruism between family
members. We model families as pairs of siblings. Each sibling exerts e⁄ort in order
to obtain output under uncertainty. A social norm dictates that a sibling with a high
output must share a speci￿ed amount of this output with his sibling, if the latter￿ s
output is low. Siblings may be truly altruistic towards each other, but not to a larger
degree than dictated by the social norm. We compare such informal family insurance
with actuarially fair formal insurance.
We show that coerced family altruism reduces individual e⁄orts in equilibrium.
However, individuals always bene￿t ex ante from living in families with coerced al-
truism, as compared with living in autarky. We show that a certain degree of coerced
family altruism is robust as a social norm in a society of sel￿sh individuals. Finally,
we show that if family members are su¢ ciently altruistic to each other, then informal
family insurance by way of coerced altruism may outperform actuarially fair insurance
programs.
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11 Introduction
The strength of family ties appear to vary across countries and over time. In a recent
paper, Alesina and Giuliano (2007) ￿nd that the strength of family ties has signi￿cant
e⁄ects on various economic outcomes, such as labor market participation, the extent of home
production and geographic mobility. Furthermore, it has been argued that individualism was
an important force behind the industrial revolution in England. Thus, Max Weber (1951)
thought that ￿the great achievement of [...] the ethical and ascetic sects of Protestantism
was to shatter the fetters of the sib [the extended family]. These religions established [...] a
common ethical way of life in opposition to the community of blood, even to a large extent
in opposition to the family. (p.237)￿In his view, a strong sense of solidarity among members
of the extended family, coupled with a hostile attitude towards strangers, promotes a culture
where nepotism may thrive and counter the e¢ cient development of markets. Likewise,
Ban￿eld (1958) thought that the ￿amoral familism￿ that he observed in certain parts of
Italy was an impediment to economic development.
Motivated by the evidence that family ties vary in strength across cultures, we here pursue
the line of thought suggested by Weber, by way of theoretically analyzing the e⁄ects of family
ties on risk-sharing and incentives. We all face risk in the form of unknown realizations of
future states of the world. Risk may in turn lead individuals to seek to pool resources and
thereby mitigate severe adverse income shocks on the individual level. However, insurance
markets are not well-developed everywhere, and where markets are poorly developed the
extended family tends to be an important source of insurance.1 This observation leads
to the following questions that we seek to answer here. First, how does the insurance
provided within the family a⁄ect work incentives for its members? Second, does such informal
insurance represent an improvement compared to autarky, that is, a situation in which each
individual lives by him- or herself and has no access to insurance whatsoever? Third, can
informal family insurance be sustained as a robust social norm in a society exposed to norm
perturbations and migration opportunities? Fourth, can actuarially fair formal insurance,
either by way of a compulsory and e¢ cient social security system or by way of a perfectly
competitive insurance market, outperform informal family insurance?
1In 2003 the total value of insurance premia (life and non-life) as a percent of GDP was 12.48 in the
US, 9.85 in France, 1.42 in Turkey, and 1.74 in Mexico (Insurance Statistics Yearbook: 1994-2003, OECD,
2005). In their survey on private transfers between households, Cox and Jimenez (1990) conclude that in
developing countries 20-90% of households receive (private) transfers, which can represent up to 20% of the
average household income. In the U.S. the corresponding ￿gures are 15% and 1%, respectively. Since the
average income of donor households exceeds that of recipient households (Cox, Galasso and Jimenez, 2006),
these transfers appear to provide some insurance. Using data from Thailand Miller and Paulson (1999) show
that remittances respond to shocks to regional rainfall.
2Since formal insurance pools the resources of a much larger number of individuals than
informal family insurance does, it is to be expected that perfectly competitive market insur-
ance would be more e¢ cient than informal family insurance. However, while this certainly
is true at a ￿xed level of individual risk, and with veri￿able information about individu-
als￿actions, here work e⁄orts, this reasoning neglects the fact that individuals￿incentive
to undertake risk-reducing e⁄orts depends on the level of insurance and how the insurance
is conditioned on their (veri￿ed) actions. Such moral-hazard phenomena are analyzed in
Helpman and La⁄ont (1975), Arnott and Stiglitz (1988, 1990) and, more recently, Bennardo
and Chiappori (2003). Since formal insurance under such asymmetric information reduces
the incentive for risk-reducing e⁄orts, a competitive insurance market equilibrium can at
best sustain partial insurance. While individuals￿actions typically are their private infor-
mation with respect to insurance companies, this is typically not the case, at least not to
the same extent, with respect to family members who provide informal insurance to each
other. Hence, a priori one cannot rule out the possibility that informal family insurance may
outperform formal (market or public) insurance in some cases. One purpose of this essay is
to theoretically explore this possibility.
The family, on the other hand, may be particularly vulnerable to the Samaritan￿ s dilemma
(Buchanan, 1975), which arises due to an altruist￿ s inability to commit not to help out a
person in need. This has been shown to lead to several ine¢ ciencies, including suboptimal
savings (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1988) and underinsurance by poor individuals (Coate, 1995).
It further seems empirically relevant to study a closely related, but distinct form of family
tie, namely, when transfers are given because of others￿expectations rather than because
of an ￿inner motive.￿For a long time, Amartya Sen has urged economists to seek a deeper
understanding of the implications of the fact that people make many decisions within the
realms of the family, see Sen (1983). As Sen (1987) put it: ￿The mixture of sel￿sh and sel￿ ess
behavior is one of the most important characteristics of group loyalty, [a mixture which]
can be seen in [...] kinship relations.￿(p.20) Such a tension between, on the one hand, the
individual￿ s sel￿sh desires and, on the other hand, the surrounding society￿ s expectations and
social norms, may be an important explanatory factor behind economic growth di⁄erentials
and the di⁄erent degrees of development in the world. An individual who lives in a society
where he or she is expected to share his or her income with other family members, sometimes
even with such relatively distant family members as ￿rst or second cousins,2 may rationally
2Dostie and Vencatachellum (2006) ￿nd that among 500 domestic workers in Tunisia, 40% see all their
wages transferred directly to their fathers; among those who make voluntary transfers instead, the average
amount remitted is 40% of the wages. According to Etounga-Manguelle (2000), people with a regular income
in today￿ s Africa are not only expected to provide help in emergency situations; they are also expected
to ￿nance the studies of younger members of the extended family, and to contribute to the many lavish
celebrations dictated by social rules; see also Mendelek Theimann (2006).
3expect to have to transfer so much of her income￿ if she is more successful than the others
in the family￿ that the motive for making e⁄ort in the ￿rst place is diluted. The same
phenomenon occurs in partnerships between individuals who share output.
To study these questions we analyze a relatively simple model in which risk-averse indi-
viduals choose a costly risk-reducing action, ￿e⁄ort,￿that determines the probability distri-
bution over output levels. We model the motive for sharing resources within a family as a
mixture of voluntary and socially coerced altruism, or as a mixture of sympathy and com-
mitment (Sen, 1983). Voluntary altruism is formalized in the usual way, as a positive weight
placed on others￿welfare, while coerced altruism is formalized as a culturally or socially im-
posed norm for intrafamily transfers. We determine the equilibrium behavior of individuals
in this model, and use these results to seek to answer the questions we ask. Moreover, we
allow for the possibility that the answers to these questions may depend on the underlying
riskiness of the environment, which in our model is captured by the ratio of the high to the
low output level.
We ￿rst study atomistic individuals (with no family ties) living in autarky. The optimal
autarky e⁄ort does not eliminate the risk of getting the low output. If one could pool
the risks of a large number (technically a continuum) of individuals, there would therefore
exist a welfare-enhancing budget-balanced insurance policy. Insurance can only be second-
best, however, due to moral hazard (an insurance policy cannot depend on the individual￿ s
e⁄ort). Since atomistic individuals do not anticipate to be helped out by relatives, they
would be willing to buy such an insurance policy: insurance markets are expected to develop
in societies where family ties are so weak that no resource sharing occurs within the family,
independent of the underlying riskiness.
We then turn to the analysis of insurance provided by the family: formally we analyze
this as a strategic interaction between two individuals who care about each others￿material
welfare, either voluntarily or under the coercion of social norms. An individual￿ s total utility
is taken to be a weighted sum of both individuals￿material utility, which in turn is determined
by each individual￿ s work e⁄ort and consumption. The weight put on the other individual￿ s
material utility is assumed to be non-negative and not greater than the weight put on one￿ s
own material utility. This weight can be interpreted in terms of altruism, or, alternatively,
in terms of the esteem derived from others who observes and evaluates one￿ s behavior, such
as members of one￿ s extended family, village or society at large. By contrast to Alger and
Weibull (2007) where we assume that altruism alone determines transfers within the family,
here we consider situations in which an individual￿ s degree of altruism di⁄ers from that
enforced by society. More precisely, we suppose that the interacting individuals live in a
society with a social norm that dictates a larger transfer than the individuals￿own altruism
4suggests. If the degree of such coerced altruism is strong, individuals feel forced to help each
other out.3
The players invest e⁄ort in production, and output may be low or high. Once the outputs
have been realized, these are observed by both individuals, and transfers occur. We assume
that an individual is expected to make a transfer to his or her sibling only if own output is
high whereas the sibling￿ s is low. We measure the level of coerced altruism by the share of
the high output that a rich individual is expected to give to a poor sibling. Consumption is
taken to equal the ￿nal output available to the individual. In our model it does not matter
whether or not individuals observe each other￿ s e⁄orts; this is because we focus on the case
where utility is separable in e⁄ort and consumption.
We solve this two-player game focusing on the case of individuals with the same loglinear
preferences over own consumption and e⁄ort.4 Then this game has a unique Nash equilib-
rium. Its qualitative features are as follows. The anticipation of receiving a transfer when
poor has a negative e⁄ect on an individual￿ s incentive to exert e⁄ort. This free-rider e⁄ect
is well-known from other analyses of altruism. Hence, the equilibrium e⁄ort decreases as the
degree of coerced altruism increases. By contrast, true altruism has a positive e⁄ect on an
individual￿ s incentive to exert e⁄ort: an altruist may exert more e⁄ort in order to have more
to give the other individual, an e⁄ect we call the ￿empathy e⁄ect￿of altruism on e⁄ort.
Despite the previous strong emphasis in the literature on the possible moral hazard e⁄ect
of intrafamily altruism, there seems to be a limited number of empirical studies on this topic.
Using data on farmer output in Mali, Azam and Gubert (2005) ￿nd that remittances from
emigrated relatives have a negative impact on agricultural output. By contrast, Kohler and
Hammel (2001) show, using census data for Slavonia from 1698, that the number of di⁄erent
crops grown by a family tended to increase as the nearby extended family increased. The
authors were expecting the opposite e⁄ect, namely that as a result of insurance a family
would invest less in risk-reducing planting strategies. However, our results suggest that
there exists an intuitive explanation for this pattern: when a family expects to help another
family out, the expected bene￿t of the risk-reducing planting strategy is increased.
3Many individuals are willing to pay in order to avoid situations where they feel coerced to behave
altruistically, even in the absence of potential social sanctions. For recent laboratory studies showing this,
see Dana et al. (2006) and Broberg et al. (2006).
4This particular game has not been studied before. Most of the literature on altruism, starting with
Becker (1974), assumes one-sided altruism (see also, e.g., Bruce and Waldman, 1990, Chami, 1998, and
Lindbeck and Nyberg, 2006). In models with two-sided altruism, typically only one of the players choose an
e⁄ort (see LaferrŁre and Wol⁄, 2006, for a recent survey), or there is no risk (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1988,
analyze the e⁄ect of two-sided altruism on savings, and Chen and Woolley, 2001, study the intrahousehold
allocation of income on private and public goods).
5We then ￿nd that while coerced altruism induces ￿involuntary￿transfers ex post, such
coercion is e¢ cient ex ante in the sense that the equilibrium expected utility is higher than
it would be in the absence of coercion￿ this is true even if individuals are sel￿sh, so that no
empathy e⁄ect arises. In such situations, it is as if social norms play the role of compulsory
but informal insurance.
We use the equilibrium analysis to determine a su¢ cient condition for coerced altruism
to be sustained as a social norm in a society with sel￿sh individuals, where those who deviate
from the norm su⁄er an exogenously given punishment. Numerical simulations suggest that
a more severe punishment would be required to sustain a given level of coerced altruism in
societies where the underlying riskiness is high. This is quite intuitive, since the bene￿t from
deviating from the norm by not transferring the socially sanctioned share of high output, is
higher when the di⁄erence between the outputs is large.
Thanks to the mitigating e⁄ect of altruism on moral hazard, risk-pooling between indi-
viduals (who cannot observe each other￿ s e⁄ort) may outperform a competitive insurance
market. Compared to formal insurance among a large number of sel￿sh individuals, the
bene￿t of the empathy e⁄ect obtained with altruistically motivated transfers between few
individuals (say, within a family) may outweigh the limitation inherent in pooling resources
of few individuals, as compared with market insurance that pools resources of a large num-
ber of individuals. We ￿nd that this occurs in environments with low underlying riskiness,
since the mitigating e⁄ect of altruism on moral hazard is particularly pronounced in these
environments. It is important to point out that, when comparing market and nonmarket
insurance we use the same measure of performance, i.e., for nonmarket insurance we do not
take into account the welfare that the individuals derive simply from being altruistic.
Our base-line model is similar to that in Arnott and Stiglitz (1991): they also allow for an
endogenous, risk-reducing e⁄ort, and they model family insurance as transfers within pairs of
ex ante identical individuals. They address a di⁄erent question, however: they ask whether,
in the presence of insurance markets, supplemental informal insurance provided by the family
improves welfare. Moreover, whereas in our model transfers within the family are driven by
altruism, in their model family transfers are the outcome of a joint agreement. Thus, in their
model, if the family members can observe each other￿ s e⁄ort, the joint agreement speci￿es
that total income should always be shared equally, and it speci￿es the ex ante optimal e⁄ort,
conditional on equal sharing. Mathematically, this is equivalent to the special case in our
model where siblings are fully altruistic towards each other (attach the same utility weight
to the other sibling￿ s welfare as to his or her own). Arnott and Stiglitz also study the case
where family members cannot observe each other￿ s e⁄ort but can enforce transfer agreements:
mathematically this is equivalent to the special case in our model where individuals are sel￿sh
6(attach no weight to their sibling￿ s welfare) and make transfers dictated by coerced altruism.
This essay also complements a large literature that seeks to determine the potential of
nonmarket insurance in the presence of constraints imposed by limited enforceability. Posner
(1980) introduced the idea that nonmarket insurance could be feasible despite limited en-
forceability, and Kimball (1988) proved this formally. Coate and Ravallion (1993) character-
ized the best nonmarket insurance arrangement that may be sustained as a non-cooperative
equilibrium in a repeated game between with two self-interested individuals. Foster and
Rosenzweig (2001) extended this analysis to allow for altruistic individuals, while Genicot
and Ray (2003) determined properties of equilibria that deter not only deviations by single
players but also by groups of players. Recently, BramoullØ and Kranton (2006) have shown
that equilibrium risk-sharing networks where people form pairwise links generally provide
partial insurance only. Following the empirical evidence that households are less than per-
fectly insured in many developing countries (see Townsend, 1994, and the literature that
followed his initial contribution), Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002) tested the hypothesis
that this is driven by limited enforceability. By contrast to this literature, in our model risk
is endogenous through individuals￿choice of e⁄ort, and we ask whether insurance markets
can function if uninsured individuals expect to be helped out by their relatives if in need.
Our model is similar to that in Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006), who analyze altruistic
parents￿incentive to instill a work norm in their children. The incentive stems from parents￿
inability to commit not to help their children if in ￿nancial need. If the children feel a
strong social norm to work (hard), then this reduces the risk that the children will be in
need, which is good for the altruistic parents. On the other hand, the parents will su⁄er
with the children if their work ethic is very demanding and the children fail. The parents
instill just enough of the social work norm in their children so that these two e⁄ects are
optimally traded o⁄. While their model is asymmetric￿ parents are altruistic and move ￿rst
and children are sel￿sh￿ our model is symmetric￿ the two siblings move simultaneously and
may be equally altruistic towards each other. Nevertheless, the issues dealt with are related,
the models similar in structure and the parametrization of preferences over consumption and
e⁄ort identical.
The remainder of the essay is organized as follows. In the next section we present and
solve the basic decision problem of an atomistic individual. We then prove that there exists
a welfare-enhancing insurance policy. In section 4 we introduce the family by presenting
the basic game between two individuals, we show that this game has a unique equilibrium,
and we conduct a comparative-statics analysis of the equilibrium outcome with respect to
altruism and coerced altruism. We further analyze the sustainability of coerced altruism as
a social norm. In section 5 we compare formal insurance with insurance provided within the
7family. Section 6 concludes by summarizing our main results and by pointing to directions
for future work. All mathematical proofs are in appendix.
2 Sel￿sh atomistic individuals
We begin by presenting the backdrop, the same base-line model as in the companion paper
Alger and Weibull (2007). Consider a sel￿sh individual who feels no wish or social pressure
to help others, living in an environment where insurance is not available. The individual
chooses an e⁄ort level that determines the probability distribution over the possible returns,
or output levels. The output is either high, yH > 0, or low, yL = yH=￿, where ￿ > 1,
the ratio between the high and low output levels, represents the riskiness of the physical
environment; this is the fraction to which output is reduced in the ￿bad￿outcome. We think
of yH as the richness of the environment.
We assume that an individual who makes an e⁄ort yielding a success probability p < 1
for the high output level and then consumes an amount c > 0 of the output achieves utility
u(c;p) = lnc + ￿ ln(1 ￿ p); (1)
where ￿ > 0. Hence, the expected utility associated with any choice of p 2 [0;1) is
plny
H + (1 ￿ p)lny
L + ￿ ln(1 ￿ p) = lny
H ￿ (1 ￿ p)ln￿ + ￿ ln(1 ￿ p)
As shown in Alger and Weibull (2007), this utility speci￿cation corresponds to log-linear
utility in consumption and e⁄ort, with ￿ as the marginal cost of e⁄ort, and with a success
probability that is exponential in e⁄ort, tending to 1 as e⁄ort goes to plus in￿nity.5 We will
refer to the quantity in (1) as material utility. (For a sel￿sh individual as we study here,
utility is material utility, while for an altruistic individual, to be studied below, utility also
includes others￿material utility).









We note that the optimal e⁄ort level, when positive, is independent of the richness of
the environment, yH, higher in a riskier environment and higher when the marginal cost ￿
5Let x ￿ 0 be e⁄ort, let u = lnc ￿ ￿x and p = 1 ￿ e￿￿x, for ￿;￿ > 0. This is equivalent with (1) for
￿ = ￿=￿.
8of e⁄ort is lower.
Considering the possibility that the success probability may be zero, the achieved ex-




















Welfare is thus increasing in the richness of the environment, yH, and decreasing in the
riskiness of the environment, ￿, and in the marginal cost of e⁄ort, ￿. The associated achieved

























Hence, the national income of an isolated country inhabited by such sel￿sh individuals would
be increasing in the richness of their environment and decreasing in their cost of e⁄ort. For
low levels of riskiness, e⁄ort is not worthwhile at all, and then national income is decreasing
in the riskiness, while for high levels of riskiness, e⁄ort is worthwhile and national income is
increasing in the riskiness of the environment. This non-monotonicity is illustrated in Figure
1.












Figure 1. Income y0 (thick curve) and utility u0 + 2 (thin curve) as a functions of the
riskiness ￿ of the environment.
93 Formal insurance
Consider a large population of ex ante identical atomistic and sel￿sh individuals facing i.i.d.
risks of the type described above. By the law of large numbers, the fraction of individuals
who end up with the low output is approximately 1 ￿ p0, where p0 is the optimal success
probability (2) for each individual.
If neither individual e⁄orts nor outputs (incomes) are veri￿able, then the moral hazard
problem for insurance systems is overwhelming since the temptation will be strong for oppor-
tunistic individuals to insure themselves and then not exert any e⁄ort. A less overwhelming,
but still signi￿cant, moral hazard problem pertains if individual e⁄orts are not veri￿able but
outputs (incomes) are. We here analyze actuarially fair insurance in this case. Suppose that
individual outputs (incomes) are veri￿able while individual e⁄orts are not. What would an
optimal actuarially fair insurance give? If the individuals could collectively choose a com-
pulsory insurance scheme ￿ a form of social security ￿ what would this then be? What
e⁄ect would insurance have on the incentive to exert e⁄ort and hence on national income?
We ￿rst focus on compulsory insurance policies. These may be provided either directly
by a government agency or by perfectly competitive private insurance companies. Formally,
an insurance policy is a pair (￿;￿) 2 [0;1]2, where the insurance premium is ￿yH and
the indemnity, net of the premium, to an individual who obtains the low output is ￿yH.
Thus, an individual who receives the high output enjoys consumption (1 ￿ ￿)yH while an
individual who receives the low output enjoys consumption (￿￿ + 1)yH=￿. Given such an
insurance policy (￿;￿), the individually optimal e⁄ort level is the same for all individuals.
The decision problem faced by each individual is equivalent with that in autarky, with the





Hence, from (2) we obtain the optimal success probability







Under insurance (￿;￿), each individual lives in a less risky environment and thus exerts
less e⁄ort than in autarky. For ￿ < ln^ ￿ all individuals exert positive e⁄ort under the
insurance policy. For ln^ ￿ < ￿ < ln￿, no individual exerts any e⁄ort under the insurance
policy, although all individuals would have exerted e⁄ort in autarky.
We de￿ne an insurance policy (￿;￿) 2 [0;1]2 to be optimal if it maximizes individual
10expected utility under the constraint that the policy is actuarially fair: ^ p￿ = (1 ￿ ^ p)￿.
In order to characterize the optimal insurance policy, for given values of ￿ and ￿, view
the individually optimal success probability ^ p, de￿ned in equation (5), as a function of the
insurance policy (￿;￿) and write each individual￿ s achieved expected utility as
^ u(￿;￿) = ^ p(￿;￿)ln(1 ￿ ￿) + [1 ￿ ^ p(￿;￿)]ln(￿ + 1=￿) + ￿ ln[1 ￿ ^ p(￿;￿)]:
This de￿nes ^ u : [0;1]2 ! R as a continuous function of ￿ and ￿. By Weierstrass￿ s Maximum
Theorem there exists an optimal insurance policy. It is not di¢ cult to show that in an
environment in which e⁄ort is worthwhile in autarky, insurance is welfare enhancing:
Proposition 1 There exists at least one optimal insurance policy (^ ￿; ^ ￿) 2 [0;1]2. The no-
insurance policy, ￿ = ￿ = 0, is suboptimal if ￿ < ln￿.
Until now we have assumed that insurance is compulsory. Suppose now it is voluntary. If
it is provided by the government, and each individual can choose whether or not to buy one
insurance policy (^ ￿; ^ ￿), then all individuals will do so, according to proposition 1. Suppose
instead that insurance is voluntary and provided by private insurance companies. In face
of the moral hazard problem￿ the non-veri￿ability of individuals￿e⁄orts￿ can the optimal
policy be obtained by way of a perfectly competitive market? Assume, thus, that there are
risk-neutral pro￿t-maximizing insurance companies who cannot verify individual e⁄orts, only
outputs (incomes). Assume also that insurance is indivisible, that is, individuals can buy
either one or zero insurance policies. If all insurance companies were to o⁄er the optimal
insurance policy (^ ￿; ^ ￿), characterized above, then it follows from proposition 1 that each
individual would buy the policy (and insurance companies would just break even). There
would be no way for an individual insurance company to earn positive pro￿ts by way of
o⁄ering another policy (￿;￿). In sum: if multiple or partial purchases of insurance policies
are not possible, then a perfectly competitive insurance market can deliver the optimal
insurance policy to a population of atomistic and sel￿sh individuals.
While proposition 1 establishes that each individual￿ s achieved expected utility is higher
under optimal insurance than in autarky, expected output, and hence national income, is
lower:















Formal insurance markets tend to be well-developed only in some countries. In many places
individuals have little or no access to formal insurance, and are instead involved in risk-
sharing arrangements at the family or the village level. We next turn to the analysis of a
society where such risk-sharing is triggered by an expectation that individuals help out less
11fortunate family members.
4 Coerced family altruism
Following in the tradition of Smith (1790) and Edgeworth (1881) among other economists,
Sen (1977) argued that individuals are not solely driven by a wish to maximize their own
material welfare. In particular, Sen identi￿ed ￿sympathy￿and ￿commitment￿as two other
motives: ￿when a person￿ s sense of well-being is psychologically dependent on someone else￿ s
welfare, it is a case of sympathy,￿and ￿one way of de￿ning commitment is in terms of a
person choosing a act that he believes will yield a lower level of personal welfare to him than
an alternative that is also available to him￿(p.327). In this section we inject both some
sympathy and some commitment into our model. Thus, assume now that individuals still
work individually but belong to families, and that in case of unequal individual output levels
between siblings, a rich sibling is expected to transfer resources to a poor sibling. Siblings
may feel sympathy towards each other, and hence a wish to help each other, but we here
focus on the case when a social norm dictates transfers that are at least as large as the
transfers that would be given voluntarily in the absence of the social norm. In other words,
people feel coerced to behave as if they were more altruistic towards other family members
than they actually are. We take such a social norm as given in this section. In section 4.3
we analyze the robustness of such social norms.
More precisely, assume now that each individual i has one sibling, denoted i0, and each
such pair interacts over two periods, along the lines of the model in the preceding section.
Thus, in the ￿rst period, both siblings simultaneously choose their success probabilities pi
and pi0. The output yi of individual i is realized at the end of the ￿rst period. For the sake
of notational and analytical convenience, we take the two siblings￿outputs to be statistically
independent random variables. This independence assumption can be relaxed to allow for
positive correlation between outputs, but this does not give more insight into the incentive
problems analyzed here (see footnote 11 in Alger and Weibull, 2007).
At the beginning of the second period, both siblings observe each others￿outputs, and
each sibling makes the socially sanctioned transfer to his or her sibling. After these transfers,
each individual￿ s disposable income, or consumption, therefore equals his output plus any
transfer received from the sibling minus any transfer given to the sibling. Since only the net
transfer matters for the ￿nal utility it su¢ ces to de￿ne the socially sanctioned net transfer
from individual i to his or her sibling i0 when the output vector is (yi;yi0), which we denote
￿i (yi;yi0). We assume that an individual who gets a high output is expected to make a net
transfer T 2 [0;1] to his or her sibling, should the latter￿ s output be low. Thus, ￿i(yi;yi0) = T
12if (yi;yi0) = (yH;yL), ￿i(yi;yi0) = ￿T if (yi;yi0) = (yL;yH), and ￿i(yi;yi0) = 0 if yi = yi0.
We analyze this interaction as a game, denoted ~ G, in which a pure strategy for individual i
is a success probability pi 2 [0;1). Each strategy pro￿le determines the total utility to sibling
i in each state (yi;yi0):
ln(yi ￿ ￿i (yi;yi0)) + ￿ln(yi0 + ￿i (yi;yi0)) + ￿ ln(1 ￿ pi) + ￿￿ ln(1 ￿ pi0);
where ￿ ￿ 0 represents the degree of true mutual altruism between the siblings.
We assume that the socially coerced transfer from rich to poor siblings takes the form
T = ~ tyH, where
~ t =
￿~ ￿ ￿ 1
￿~ ￿ + ￿
; (6)
and ~ ￿ 2 [1=￿;1]. This form is analytically convenient, but also natural, since ~ tyH is the
transfer that a rich individual with true altruism ~ ￿ would choose to make voluntarily to a
poor sibling (see equation (13) in Alger and Weibull, 2007). Hence, our assumption that the
social norm dictates a transfer than is not smaller than what siblings would freely choose
may be succinctly expressed as ~ ￿ ￿ ￿.6
4.1 Equilibrium and comparative statics
In the ￿rst period, each individual independently chooses a success probability. The (ex
ante) expected total utility for individual i, which is also his or her payo⁄ in game ~ G, can be
expressed as a function of the two success probabilities:
Ui(pi;pi0) = (1 + ￿)lny
H ￿ (1 ￿ pi)(1 ￿ pi0)(1 + ￿)ln￿ (7)
+ pi(1 ￿ pi0)[ln(1 ￿ ~ t) + ￿ln(1=￿ + ~ t)]
+ pi0(1 ￿ pi)[ln(1=￿ + ~ t) + ￿ln(1 ￿ ~ t)]
+ ￿ ln(1 ￿ pi) + ￿￿ ln(1 ￿ pi0):
Each player has a unique best reply to the other￿ s strategy. The following proposition
characterizes the unique Nash equilibrium of ~ G.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the two siblings are ex ante identical, with a common degree
of altruism, ￿, and live in a society with coerced altruism ~ ￿ ￿ maxf1=￿;￿g. Then ~ G has a
6By contrast, Alger and Weibull (2007) assume that transfers are voluntary and driven solely by true
altruism. This corresponds to the special case ~ ￿ = ￿.
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~ ￿ + 1
￿
+ ln￿ ￿ ￿:
Otherwise the common success probability ~ p is the unique zero in (0;1) of
(1 ￿ p ￿ ￿p)ln
￿
￿ + 1
￿ + ~ ￿￿
￿
+ (￿ ￿ p ￿ ￿p)ln
￿
~ ￿ + ~ ￿￿





Note that, even if ln￿ > ￿ so that the autarky e⁄ort p0 is positive, here the success
probability may be nil if ln￿ > ￿. To a relatively sel￿sh individual, the prospect of having
to support a poor sibling does not give much incentive to work hard and the prospect of
being helped out if poor has a disincentive e⁄ect. In fact it is not di¢ cult to show that ￿,
the common degree of true altruism, has a positive incentive e⁄ect on the success probability
while the degree of coerced altruism, ~ ￿, has a negative e⁄ect.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the two siblings are ex ante identical, are truly altruistic to-
wards each other of degree ￿ 2 [0;1], and live in a society with coerced altruism ~ ￿ ￿ ￿, where
￿~ ￿ > 1. Their equilibrium success probability ~ p, is increasing in ￿ and decreasing in ~ ￿.
Increasing true altruism entails an empathy e⁄ect: the individuals take into account the
utility of the other individual to a larger extent, and therefore have an incentive to increase
their e⁄ort. Increasing coerced altruism entails a free-rider e⁄ect: an increase in ~ ￿ means
that the individual gets to keep less should he be lucky and his sibling unlucky, and gets a
larger transfer in the opposite case.
4.2 Welfare
To make comparisons with settings where individuals are sel￿sh we use the equilibrium
expected material utility ~ u as a welfare measure. Proposition 2 de￿nes the equilibrium
success probability as a function of both true altruism ￿ and coerced altruism ~ ￿, so we may
write:
~ u(￿; ~ ￿) = lny
H + ~ p(￿; ~ ￿)[1 ￿ ~ p(￿; ~ ￿)]ln
￿￿
1 ￿ ~ t
￿￿
1=￿ + ~ t
￿￿
(8)
￿ [1 ￿ ~ p(￿; ~ ￿)]
2 ln￿ + ￿ ln[1 ￿ ~ p(￿; ~ ￿)]:
We ￿nd that ~ u is increasing in the common degree of true altruism, for any given degree of
coerced altruism, ceteris paribus.
14Proposition 4 For any ￿ > 1, ￿ > 0 and ~ ￿ > 1=￿, ~ u is increasing in ￿, for ￿ ￿ ~ ￿.
In our companion paper we analyze the special case ~ ￿ = ￿, i.e., transfers are driven solely
by true altruism. There we show that the level of true altruism that maximizes the expected
material utility is full altruism, ￿ = 1. Together with proposition 4 this result implies that
in our model the vector of coerced and true altruism (~ ￿;￿) that maximizes the expected
material utility involves sharing output equally, ~ ￿ = 1, and full true altruism, ￿ = 1.
Coerced altruism arguably exists in many parts of the world. Can such a social or cultural
norm be bene￿cial in terms of (ex ante) expected material utility? In order to analyze this
question in its starkest form, consider a pair of completely sel￿sh siblings, ￿ = 0, who live in
a society with coerced altruism of degree ~ ￿ > 1=￿. Equation (7) gives an expression for the
ex ante expected total utility in equilibrium. In the special case of sel￿sh siblings, this is the
same as the ex ante expected material utility ~ u(0; ~ ￿), where ~ u(0; ~ ￿) is de￿ned in equation
(8). Figure 2 plots this expected material utility against the level ~ ￿ of coerced altruism, for
￿ = 5 and ￿ = 0:5.
Figure 2. Expected material utility ~ u(0; ~ ￿) of sel￿sh individuals with coerced altruism ~ ￿
(for ￿ = 5, and ￿ = 0:5)
As ~ ￿ increases beyond 1=￿, the smallest value of ~ ￿ for which a positive transfer may occur,
we see that the expected material utility increases. Hence, here the marginal ￿bene￿t￿of
coerced altruism (the imposed mutual insurance) outweighs its marginal ￿cost￿ (reduced
e⁄ort). In this example, coerced family altruism is thus advantageous ex ante, in spite of its
adverse e⁄ect on e⁄ort. This can be shown more generally: Sel￿sh siblings are better o⁄in a
society with coerced altruism than living in autarky.7 Moreover, the optimal level of coerced
7In a similar vein, Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) show that a pair of sel￿sh siblings who cannot observe each
other￿ s e⁄orts (and therefore not enforce transfers conditional on e⁄orts) would nonetheless gain by agreeing
15altruism does not dictate that siblings should split even￿ the rich sibling should keep more
than half of the joint output:
Proposition 5 In a society with sel￿sh individuals (￿ = 0), the level of coerced altruism





~ u(0; ~ ￿) ￿ 1:
The intuition for the optimal ~ ￿ to exceed 1=￿ > 0 is as follows. First, for ~ ￿ < 1=￿ no
transfers are given and thus e⁄orts are constant when ~ ￿ is changed. Consequently also the
expected material utility is then constant. At ~ ￿ = 1=￿, however, material utility increases
when ~ ￿ is marginally increased. An increase in ~ ￿ will obviously increase the transfer between
a rich and a poor sibling. Because of the concavity of the utility from consumption, this
increased insurance will enhance both siblings￿ex ante expected material utility if they would
not change their e⁄orts. Consider now the e⁄ort choice by one of the siblings, i. By the
envelope theorem, a marginal increase in ~ ￿ will have no ￿rst-order e⁄ect on i0s expected
utility. However, also the other sibling, i0, will change his or her e⁄ort. But it turns out
that, precisely at ~ ￿ = 1=￿, also this marginal change in behavior has no ￿rst-order e⁄ect on
the expected material utility of sibling i.
While the expected utility to sel￿sh siblings is higher under coerced altruism than without
it, e⁄orts and thus the expected output ~ y is lower, where
~ y = y
L + (y
H ￿ y





4.3 Coerced altruism as a robust social norm
Which degree of coerced family altruism will prevail as a social norm in the long run, in
a population consisting of identical sel￿sh individuals, in a given physical environment?
Suppose that a certain degree of coerced altruism, ~ ￿, is a social norm in a subset of the
population, group A, while another degree of coerced altruism, ~ ￿0 , is the social norm in
another subset of the population, group B. Suppose, moreover, that each group is in its
corresponding equilibrium, as de￿ned in section 4.1. Thus ~ u(0; ~ ￿) is the expected material
utility in group A and ~ u(0; ~ ￿0) that in group B￿ see equation (8). A situation in which
~ u(0; ~ ￿0) < ~ u(0; ~ ￿) does not appear to be socially stable. All individuals being sel￿sh by
assumption, individuals, families and local communities in group B would be keen to adopt
ex ante to a contract whereby a rich sibling would make a transfer to a poor one.
16the social norm of group A, since that results in higher welfare. Such a change of social norms
could occur either by adaptation or by migration. Given such destabilizing possibilities, we
call a degree of coerced altruism ~ ￿ socially robust if there exists no degree of coerced altruism
~ ￿0 6= ~ ￿ such that ~ u(0; ~ ￿0) > ~ u(0; ~ ￿). Clearly a socially robust degree of altruism, according
to this de￿nition, is an optimal degree identi￿ed in proposition 5.
Another relevant question is the enforcement of a given degree of coerced altruism. We
will not go into any depth here, only make one observation. Suppose that coerced altruism
of some degree ~ ￿ is an internalized social norm in a population. Individuals who give a
smaller transfer than ~ t to their sibling, when that sibling is poor and they themselves are
rich, experience disutility, and more disutility the larger fraction of the population (or their
peer group) adheres to the social norm. Formally, this amounts to a modi￿cation of the
model above as follows. Consider a pair of identical siblings, both sel￿sh. Let ~ p be the
equilibrium success probability (de￿ned in proposition 2) and let z 2 [0;1] be the population
share who adhere to the norm by way of giving a transfer t ￿ ~ t when rich and their sibling
is poor (where ~ t is de￿ned in equation (6)). Let ’(z) be the disutility experienced by an
individual who deviates from this norm, where ’ is an increasing function with ’(0) = 0
and ’(1) = ￿ > 0. Since by assumption all individuals are sel￿sh, a deviator will not give





H ￿ (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ~ p)ln￿ ￿ p(1 ￿ ~ p)’(z)
+(1 ￿ p)~ pln(1=￿ + ~ t) + ￿ ln(1 ￿ p): (9)
Let pd be the (generically unique) solution to this program.
In this generalized model of coerced altruism among identical sel￿sh individuals, coerced
altruism of degree ~ ￿ will thus prevail as a social norm, z = 1, if and only if
￿p
d(1 ￿ ~ p) + ~ p(1 ￿ ~ p)ln
￿￿
1 ￿ ~ t
￿￿
1=￿ + ~ t
￿￿
￿ (1 ￿ ~ p)
2 ln￿ + ￿ ln(1 ￿ ~ p) (10)
￿ ￿(1 ￿ p
d)(1 ￿ ~ p)ln￿ + (1 ￿ p
d)~ pln(1=￿ + ~ t) + ￿ ln(1 ￿ p
d).
We also note that, viewed as a game with a continuum of players, there may exist multiple
equilibria for certain parameter combinations; it is possible that both z = 1 and z = 0 are
equilibria.8 In the ￿rst equilibrium, all individuals adhere to the social norm of coerced altru-
ism of degree ~ ￿ while in the second equilibrium nobody gives any transfer (and experiences
8Indeed, there may also exist a whole continuum of intermediate equilibria where the population share z
is such that all individuals are indi⁄erent between adhering to the norm or deviating from it.
17no disutility from doing so, since everybody deviates).
Is coerced altruism easier to sustain as a social norm in a harsher climate? We can
illustrate this by studying the range of ￿-values for which the adherence condition (10) is
met, as a function of ￿. Thus, in ￿gure 3 the lower curve shows the lowest value ￿, of the
cost in￿ icted on deviators, for which coerced altruism ~ ￿ = 0:25 may be sustained as a social
norm (for ￿ = 0:5). As expected, the temptation to deviate from the norm is larger for
larger values of ￿: the threshold value increases as ￿ increases. The upper curve in the ￿gure
further shows that for any ￿ a larger punishment would be required to sustain a higher level
of coerced altruism, ~ ￿ = 0:5 (see the upper curve), as expected.
Figure 3. Sustainability of coerced altruism as a social norm, as a function of ￿ and ￿
(lower curve: ~ ￿ = 0:25; upper curve: ~ ￿ = 0:50)
In sum our analysis shows that informal insurance by way of coerced altruism is bene￿-
cial, and that it may arise as a social norm. However, intuition would suggest that formal
insurance institutions, which pool the risks of large numbers of individuals, would be even
better. It is indeed easy to establish that sel￿sh individuals would rather live in a society
where they have access to formal insurance than in one with coerced altruism, even if coerced
altruism is at its optimal level:
Proposition 6 For sel￿sh individuals, the expected material utility under coerced family
altruism is lower than under optimal compulsory insurance.
However, this does not answer whether coerced altruism, if coupled with some true al-
truism, would also be dominated by formal insurance. We next analyze this question. In
particular, we will analyze incentives for people to migrate from developing to developed
countries, and compare the welfare of immigrants to that of the local population.
185 Formal insurance vs. coerced altruism
For the purposes of this thought experiment we assume that coerced altruism is non-binding,
i.e., ￿ = ~ ￿, and we will refer to ￿ as the strength of family ties. By virtue of proposition 4
this assumption gives informal insurance the best possible chance against formal insurance.
Consider a pair of siblings living in some country, A, where no formal insurance exists,
but where family ties are very strong, ￿A = 1. Assuming that this sibling pair would keep
its strong family ties if it were to move to another country, would it have an incentive to
migrate to country B, where family ties are weak, ￿B = 0, and where an optimal compulsory
insurance system (for the inhabitants of B) is in place? If so, how would this sibling pair
fare compared to the original inhabitants of country B, in terms of material utility and
income? Let (yH
A;￿A) and (yH
B;￿B) denote the sibling pair￿ s environment in country A
and B, respectively. An incentive for the sibling pair to migrate would obviously exist if
yH
B > yH
A and ￿A < ￿B; then the expected material utility, and hence also total (altruistic)
utility, would be higher in country B. Consider, therefore, a situation in which the siblings￿
incomes, when successful, are the same in both countries, yH
A = yH
B = 1, but the riskiness
may di⁄er (and country B has an insurance scheme).
In country B the compulsory insurance policy (^ ￿B; ^ ￿B) entails an income riskiness ^ ￿B,
derived from the triplet (￿B; ^ ￿B; ^ ￿B) according to equation (4)). If the pair of siblings moved
from country A to country B, they would represent a negligible part of the population there,
and would therefore have no e⁄ect on the optimal insurance contract. They may therefore
view the income riskiness ^ ￿B in country B as ￿xed and given. Since the optimal insurance
policy (^ ￿B; ^ ￿B) is second best, ^ ￿B > 1 = ￿A, a successful immigrant sibling (obtaining the
high output) would make a transfer to his or her unsuccessful sibling (obtaining the low
output) even in country B. As long as ^ ￿B ￿ ￿A, the siblings would be as well o⁄ as in their
country of origin. In fact, the next proposition implies that if this inequality is strict, they
would be strictly better o⁄ in the new country, both in terms of their material utility, and
in terms of their total (altruistic) utility.
Proposition 7 Consider game G played by two fully altruistic siblings. In equilibrium, their
expected material utility is strictly decreasing in ￿, ceteris paribus.
Thus, under our hypothesis yH
A = yH
B, the sibling pair would want to migrate if, and only
if, the income riskiness in country B, ^ ￿B, is lower than that in country A, ￿A.
Assuming that the cost of achieving a particular success probability is the same for
everyone, ￿A = ￿B, would the immigrated sibling pair make a higher or a lower e⁄ort than
19the locals? The only di⁄erence between the immigrants and the locals is the strength of
their family ties: ￿A = 1 > 0 = ￿B. From the above analysis we know that individuals in
altruistic families may make a higher or a lower e⁄ort than sel￿sh individuals, depending on
the environment. Thus, the immigrants may get a higher or lower expected income than the
locals. In any event, the immigrants enjoy a higher expected material utility than the locals.
Until now we have assumed that insurance is compulsory in country B. Suppose instead
that it is voluntary. If the immigrant sibling pair would not purchase any insurance policy.
If yH
A = yH
B, proposition 7 implies that the sibling pair would have an incentive to migrate
if, and only if, ￿B ￿ ￿A. Should this condition hold and the sibling pair migrate, would they
necessarily be worse o⁄than the locals, in terms of their expected material utility, by relying
solely on each others￿altruism rather than on the formal insurance available in country B?
Surprisingly, the answer is no.
A limitation of intrafamily transfers is the absence of transfers of resources from states
of nature in which all family members are well o⁄ to states in which they all are poor. By
contrast, an insurance market that pools resources of a large number of individuals exposed
to idiosyncratic risks enables transfers to a poor individual even when also his or her sibling is
poor. However, market insurance has a disincentive e⁄ect on e⁄ort, and typically insurance
companies cannot monitor e⁄ort while in many cases family members can. The question
that we address here is whether this disincentive e⁄ect can be stronger than that caused
by true altruism. We illustrate the relevant trade-o⁄s between insurance and incentives in
the model outlined above by comparing the expected material utility under optimal formal
insurance with that under intrafamily transfers in a few numerical examples.9
Consider ￿rst the case of ￿B = 5 and ￿A = ￿B = 0:5. From section 2.2, we obtain
(by way of Matlab), the optimal insurance coverage ^ ￿ ’ :126. This implies an equilibrium
success probability of ^ p ’ 0:489 and an expected material utility of about ￿0:98.10 The
horizontal line in Figure 4 represents this material utility level, while the curve is the graph
of the expected material utility to an altruistic sibling without insurance, as a function of the
common degree of altruism ￿. This example shows that in a society with well-functioning
insurance markets, individuals with strong altruistic family ties who do not buy insurance,
such as our immigrant siblings, may obtain higher expected material utility than sel￿sh
9In fact, while we put family ties at a disadvantage by assuming the smallest possible number of family
members, we put it to an advantage by assuming uncorrelated risks across family members. Families that
live close together and undertake identical production tasks will face positively correlated risks and hence
more rarely end up with asymmetric outcomes.
10As is well-known, in this type of model non-convexities in preferences over insurance policies may arise
when the e⁄ect of the insurance on the e⁄ort is taken into account (see Arnott and Stiglitz, 1988). However,
in our examples the maximization problem is well-behaved.
20individuals who buy formal insurance, such as the natives of country B.
Figure 4. Expected material utility under optimal insurance ^ u(^ ￿; ^ ￿) (horizontal line) and
under true family altruism ~ u(￿;￿) (the curve).
However, if the riskiness of the environment is su¢ ciently high, then formal insurance
yields a higher expected material utility than fully altruistic family ties, for all degrees of
altruism. With ￿ on the horizontal axis and ￿ on the vertical, Figure 5 (generated with
Matlab) illustrates how our fully altruistic immigrant siblings fare in comparison with the
optimally insured sel￿sh natives. In the parameter region below the curve, the former fare
better, in terms of expected material utility, than the latter.11
Figure 5. Optimal informal insurance, ~ ￿ = ￿ = 1, outperforms optimal formal insurance
(^ ￿; ^ ￿) for values of (￿;￿) below the curve.
11Note that the condition ￿ < ln￿, presumed in our analysis, is met by all points in the diagram.
216 Conclusion
Evidence indicates that family ties are stronger in some parts of the world than in others,
and that this may have been so for several centuries. This observation prompted us to ask
how the strength of family ties a⁄ects economic outcomes. Focusing on the family￿ s poten-
tially important role as an insurance provider for its members, we conducted a theoretical
investigation of several questions, including how the strength of family ties a⁄ect economic
outcomes such as the choice of a risk-reducing e⁄ort, and whether insurance provided within
the family may be a good substitute for market insurance. To address these questions we
proposed a simple model of individuals in an environment with uncertain outputs, where
individuals may reduce the risk at some cost, and where families consist of pairs of identical
individuals (which we may think of as grown-up siblings). In our model, insurance within a
family took the form of transfers between the two family members, and although we allowed
for siblings to be altruistic towards each other, we assumed that the transfers between them
were dictated by social norms (coerced altruism). A parameter (￿) captured the riskiness of
the environment (the ratio between the highest and the lowest possible output).
We found that whereas coerced altruism entails a free-rider e⁄ect and thus decreases
the level of risk-reducing e⁄ort, true altruism mitigates this free-rider e⁄ect by way of an
empathy e⁄ect: an altruistic individual has an incentive to increase his or her risk-reducing
e⁄ort for two reasons. First, to increase the probability of being able to help a poor sibling,
and, second, to decrease the probability of being unlucky and forcing the sibling to help him
or her out. Furthermore we showed that even if individuals are sel￿sh so that only the free-
rider e⁄ect is present, coerced altruism is bene￿cial from an ex ante perspective, although it
gives rise to involuntary transfers ex post.
Finally, we found that if both coerced altruism and true altruism are su¢ ciently strong,
an individual who only has access to insurance by way of coerced altruism within the family,
may be better o⁄than an individual who only has access to formal insurance. Moreover, this
tends to be true if the underlying riskiness is low. If riskiness is low, sel￿sh individuals have a
low incentive to provide a risk-reducing e⁄ort even without insurance, and the moral hazard
implied by formal insurance then implies that an insurance market can only play a very
minor role, despite its ability to pool the resources of a very large number of individuals. By
contrast, strong coerced altruism coupled with strong true altruism means that individuals
have an additional incentive to provide a risk-reducing e⁄ort, namely, the utility that an
altruistic individual derives from helping out the other. Where riskiness is low this empathy
e⁄ect of altruism implies that individuals undertake a higher risk-reducing e⁄ort than if
they were living in autarky. Thus, if individuals are rewarded for sharing with others (in
22our model this reward comes in the form of altruism, but society may also provide rewards)
a high level of resource sharing within the family does not necessarily imply moral hazard:
indeed, instead moral protection may arise, whereby stronger family ties may lead individuals
to choose a higher e⁄ort. Compared to market insurance, the bene￿t of moral protection
may outweigh the cost associated with the family￿ s inability to share the resources of a very
large number of individuals.
To keep our analysis simple, we modeled a family as a pair of ex ante identical individuals.
It would be desirable and interesting to see whether our results extend to a richer model,
with larger families, and heterogeneous individuals. It may also be fruitful to apply some
of the concepts of our model to other settings, in particular to credit markets. In many
developing countries, as well as in developed ones, we see micro￿nance systems emerge, such
as the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh (for a survey, see ArmendÆriz and Morduch, 2005).
In some of these programs poor individuals take bank loans backed by their relatives and
neighbors: if a loan-taker defaults, a whole group of individuals are liable. Allowing for
altruistically motivated individuals may provide additional insights regarding some of the
successes of micro￿nance programs.
23Appendix
We here give mathematical proofs of propositions made in the text.
Proof of proposition 1










The following equation de￿nes the set of (￿;￿) satisfying budget balance:
^ p(￿;￿)￿ ￿ [1 ￿ ^ p(￿;￿)]￿ = 0.




1 ￿ ^ p(￿;￿) ￿ (￿ + ￿)
@^ p(￿;￿)
@￿




Evaluated at (￿;￿) = (0;0), we thus have, for ￿ < ln￿ and hence ^ p(￿;￿) positive and
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It follows that there exists a budget-balanced policy with ￿ > 0 that yields a higher expected
utility than ￿ = 0.
Proof of proposition 2
Let
~ F (p) = (1 ￿ p ￿ ￿p)ln
￿
1 ￿ ~ t
￿
+ (￿ ￿ p ￿ ￿p)ln
￿













~ ￿￿ ￿ 1
~ ￿￿ + ￿
:
24A common strictly positive equilibrium e⁄ort p necessarily satis￿es ~ F (p) = 0. For ~ ￿￿ > 1
this yields the following polynomial equation in p after some algebraic manipulation:
￿
ln(~ ￿=￿) + 2ln
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Let A, B, and C be the coe¢ cients in equation (13), when written in the form Ap2￿Bp+C =
0. Note that A > 0 i⁄ (~ ￿ ￿ 1=￿)(￿ ￿ ~ ￿) ￿ 0. It follows that B2 ￿ 4AC ￿ 0 for all ~ ￿ 2 [0;1],
￿ > 1 and ￿ ￿ 0 such that ~ ￿￿ ￿ 1, for B2 ￿ 4AC > (2A ￿ B)2 i⁄ A(B ￿ A ￿ C) > 0 i⁄












and A > 0 implies q2 ￿ q1.
Next we prove that q2 > 1 when ~ ￿￿ > 1 and ￿ > 0. For this purpose, note that q2 > 1
i⁄
p
B2 ￿ 4AC > 2A ￿ B i⁄ B2 ￿ 4AC > (2A ￿ B)2 i⁄ A(A ￿ B + C) < 0, an inequality
that holds if ~ ￿ 2 [0;1], ￿ > 1, ~ ￿￿ > 1 and ￿ > 0.
It remains to show that the smaller root q1 is less than 1. This follows from the fact that
~ F is continuous, limp!1 ~ F(p) = ￿1, and limp!￿1 ~ F(p) = +1. To see the last property
note that the coe¢ cient for p is negative when ~ ￿￿ > 1, since
ln
1 + ￿
1 + ~ ￿
+ ln
~ ￿(1 + 1=￿)
1 + ~ ￿
> 0 , (~ ￿ ￿ 1=￿)(￿ ￿ ~ ￿) > 0:
Finally, we note that p > 0 () ~ F(0) > 0 ,












~ ￿(1 + ￿)
1 + ~ ￿
￿
￿ ln￿:








25Proof of proposition 3
A necessary ￿rst-order condition for an interior and symmetric Nash equilibrium ~ p is ~ F(~ p) =
0, which may be written
~ F(~ p) = ￿ln ~ ￿+(1 + ￿)ln
￿
1 + ￿











~ ￿(1 + 1=￿)






This equation implicitly de￿nes ~ p as a function of ￿ and ~ ￿. Di⁄erentiation of the equation




[1 ￿ ~ p(~ ￿;￿)](￿ ￿ ~ ￿) + ~ p(~ ￿;￿)(￿~ ￿ ￿ 1)
~ ￿(1 + ~ ￿)
￿
￿














￿ 0 i⁄ (~ ￿ ￿ 1=￿)(1 ￿ ~ ￿=￿) ￿ 0. Hence, @~ p(~ ￿;￿)=@~ ￿ < 0 when
￿ < ~ ￿.






















Proof of proposition 4
Assume a degree of coerced altruism ~ ￿, and hence a transfer ~ t (see equation (6)). For any
common success probability p the expected material utility to a sibling is
v(p) = ￿ ln(1 ￿ p) ￿ (1 ￿ p)
2 ln￿
+p(1 ￿ p)[ln(1 ￿ ~ t) + ln(1=￿ + ~ t)]:
Let ~ p(￿; ~ ￿) be the unique success probability in game ~ G. Then the expected material utility
may be written as follows:
~ u(￿; ~ ￿) = v(~ p(￿; ~ ￿))
= ￿ ln[1 ￿ ~ p(￿; ~ ￿)] ￿ [1 ￿ ~ p(￿; ~ ￿)]
2 ln￿
+~ p(￿; ~ ￿)[1 ￿ ~ p(￿; ~ ￿)][ln(1 ￿ ~ t) + ln(1=￿ + ~ t)]:




@p jp=~ p(￿;~ ￿)
￿
@~ p(￿; ~ ￿)
@￿
:
From the proof of Proposition 3 we know that the second factor is positive, implying that
@~ u(￿;~ ￿)
@￿ has the same sign as
@v(p)
@p jp=~ p(￿;~ ￿). It thus remains to show that, for a given ~ ￿ ,
@v(p)
@p jp=~ p(￿;~ ￿) > 0 for all ￿ < ~ ￿. This is achieved by proving that, at a ￿xed and given
equilibrium transfer ~ t > 0, v is strictly concave in p, and reaches its maximum at some
pv > ~ p(￿; ~ ￿). First, we can easily see that v is strictly concave, since
v
00(p) = ￿2ln￿ ￿ 2[ln(1 ￿ ~ t) + ln(1=￿ + ~ t)] ￿
￿
(1 ￿ p)2 < 0:
Second pv is de￿ned by the ￿rst-order condition
(1 ￿ 2p)ln
￿
1 ￿ ~ t
￿
+ (1 ￿ 2p)ln
￿






Compare this with the equation de￿ning the equilibrium probability ~ p, which is the value of
p satisfying:
(1 ￿ p ￿ ￿p)ln
￿
1 ￿ ~ t
￿
+ (￿ ￿ p ￿ ￿p)ln
￿






The right-hand side in these equations being increasing in p, a su¢ cient condition for ~ p < pv










1 ￿ ~ t
￿￿
> 0;
which is true for any p 2 [0;1), and ~ t > 0.
Proof of proposition 5
For ￿ = 0 we get from (7):
~ Ui (pi;pi0) = ￿(1 ￿ pi)(1 ￿ pi0)ln￿ + pi(1 ￿ pi0)ln(1 ￿ ~ t)
+ pi0(1 ￿ pi)ln(1=￿ + ~ t) + ￿ ln(1 ￿ pi);
where ~ t is given in (6). Hence, at pi = pi0 = ~ p(0; ~ ￿):
27@
@~ ￿
~ Ui (pi;pi0) =
@ ~ Ui (pi;pi0)
@pi
@~ p(0; ~ ￿)
@~ ￿
+
@ ~ Ui (pi;pi0)
@pi0
@~ p(0; ~ ￿)
@~ ￿
￿ ~ p(0; ~ ￿)[1 ￿ ~ p(0; ~ ￿)]
1
1 ￿ ~ t
d~ t
d~ ￿
+ ~ p(0; ~ ￿)[1 ￿ ~ p(0; ~ ￿)]
1




Using the two ￿rst-order conditions
@ ~ Ui(pi;pi0)
@pi = 0 and
@ ~ Ui0(pi;pi0)
@pi0 = 0, evaluated at pi = pi0 =
~ p(0; ~ ￿), this simpli￿es to
@
@~ ￿
~ Ui (pi;pi0) = ~ p(0; ~ ￿)[1 ￿ ~ p(0; ~ ￿)]
￿
1
1=￿ + ~ t
￿
1








1=￿ + ~ t









For all ~ ￿ < 1=￿ we have ~ t = 0, and hence @
@~ ￿ ~ Ui (pi;pi0) = 0. For all ~ ￿ > 1=￿, the ￿rst
square bracket is positive, and equals ￿ ￿ 1 > 0 for ~ ￿￿ = 1. Since d~ t
d~ ￿ > 0 for all ~ ￿ ￿ 1=￿,
we conclude that the ￿rst term is positive. As for the second term we note that the square
bracket vanishes when ~ ￿￿ = 1 because then ~ t = 0, and ~ p(0; ~ ￿) is de￿ned by ~ F(p) = 0.
At ~ ￿ = 1, the ￿rst square bracket is zero, and so is the ￿rst term in the second square




@~ ￿ remains, which by proposition 3 is non-positive.
Proof of proposition 6
For a given e⁄ort level p, the expected material utility for a sel￿sh individual under coerced
altruism with a transfer ~ t equals
(1 ￿ p)
2 lny
L + p(1 ￿ p)ln(y
L + ~ t) + p
2 lny
H + p(1 ￿ p)ln(y
H ￿ ~ t): (16)
For a given e⁄ort level p, the expected material utility for a sel￿sh individual under
compulsory insurance (￿;￿) with ￿ = p~ t and ￿ = (1 ￿ p)~ t (note that such an insurance
would be budget-balanced) equals
(1 ￿ p)ln(y
L + p~ t) + pln[y
H ￿ (1 ￿ p)~ t]










H + (1 ￿ p)(y
H ￿ ~ t)
￿
:
Due to the strict concavity of the logarithm function this is strictly greater than the
expression in (16). Moreover, with formal insurance the individual chooses the e⁄ort level
that maximizes his expected material utility, which therefore must be higher than with
coerced altruism.
Proof of proposition 7
From proposition 4 in Alger and Weibull (2007) we know that if ￿ = 1 the equilibrium
expected material utility equals the maximum value of
W(p;t) = p(1 ￿ p)[ln(1 ￿ t) + ln(1=￿ + t)] ￿ (1 ￿ p)









and (p;t) 2 [0;1]2. In particular, t = (1 ￿ 1=￿)=2 and there exists a unique p satisfying the
following necessary ￿rst-order condition:
@W(p;t)
@p




which de￿nes p as a function of ￿. We may therefore write the expected material utility as
follows:
Z(p(￿);￿) = p(￿)[1 ￿ p(￿)]2ln
1 + 1=￿
2
￿ [1 ￿ p(￿)]
















where the last equality follows from the de￿nition of p(￿). Finally, we obtain:
@Z(p(￿);￿)
@￿




29We have now shown that if ￿ = 1 the individual expected material utility decreases as
￿ increases. Since each individual￿ s utility is the sum of both siblings￿expected material
utilities this implies that the expected utility also decreases as ￿ increases.
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